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RETRIBUTIVISM, ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY,
AND AGENT CAUSALISM

Christopher P. Taggart1
Except for limited forms of omissions liability, Anglo-American criminal law
generally requires a criminal defendant, D, to perform a voluntary action before imposing
criminal liability. Further, D must be morally responsible for performing the action for D
to deserve punishment for doing it. So, a puzzle about moral responsibility connected to
longstanding debates about determinism and free will, a puzzle that implies that D is never
morally responsible for performing any action, must have a moral-responsibilitypreserving solution for any form of retributivism to be true. One compatibilist solution
denies that moral responsibility requires what has been termed “ultimate responsibility.”
Whether ultimate responsibility is required for moral responsibility is a contested issue.
And, if ultimate responsibility is required for moral responsibility, then the compatibilist
solution is unavailable. This article argues that, if ultimate responsibility is required for
moral responsibility, then, unless both indeterminism and agent causalism are true, any
form of retributivism is false.
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INTRODUCTION

Two longstanding sets of philosophical debates are significantly related. The first
concerns how, if at all, retributivism is a defensible element of a theory of the justification
of legal punishment. The second concerns how best to resolve various puzzles surrounding
causal determinism and free will. A very broad question arises: What position should one
take regarding one set of debates given the position one takes regarding the other set? This
question delineates the general topic of this article.
More specifically, this article argues that, on the assumption that a criminal
GHIHQGDQW¶V '¶V  PRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU FRPPLWWLQJ D FULPH UHTXLUHV '¶V ³ultimate
responsibility´ for committing that crime, any retributive theory of punishment is true only
if both indeterminism and agent causalism are true. In other words, on the assumption that
ultimate responsibility is required for moral responsibility: (1) If determinism is true, then
no retributive theory of punishment is true; and, (2) if agent causalism is false, then no
retributive theory of punishment is true, even if determinism is false. This paper, therefore,
presents no arguments against retributivism backed by a compatibilist position that denies
WKH QHFHVVLW\ RI '¶V XOWLPDWH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU FRPPLWWLQJ D FULPH IRU ' WR GHVHUYH
punishment for committing that crime. 2
To defend its thesis, the article proceeds as follows. Part II explains ³retributive
reasons´ and argues that such facts must exist for any form of retributivism to be true.
Section III presents a puzzle related to philosophical debates concerning determinism, free
will, and the control that agents exercise when they perform voluntary actions. Part IV
discusses ³ultimate´ responsibility for doing something and explains why, if ³true´ moral
responsibility for an action requires ultimate responsibility for it, then determinism
forecloses any retributivism-preserving solution to Part III¶V SX]]OH. Part V introduces
agent causalism and argues that, even if determinism is false, agent causalism must be true
for there to be a solution to Part III¶VSX]]OHWKDWSUHVHUYHVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIretributivism.
Part VI concludes by briefly recapitulating the main line of argument.
II.

RETRIBUTIVE REASONS

Retributive theories of punishment3 emphasize D FULPLQDO GHIHQGDQW¶V '¶V4
negative moral desert.5 The retributivist idea of moral desert is familiar: when D does

2. Although I think that compatibilism is false, I offer no arguments for incompatibilism in this paper.
3. %\ ³SXQLVKPHQW´ WKLVSDSHU PHDQVSXQLVKPHQW LPSRVHGXQGHUFULPLQDO ODZ 7KHRULHV Rf punishment
answer at least WZRTXHVWLRQV³7RZKRPPD\SXQLVKPHQWEHDSSOLHG"+RZVHYHUHO\PD\ZHSXQLVK"´+/$
HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 2 (1968). If a punishment of D is justified, then it is morally permissible for the state to
inflict that punishment upon D. This article SUHVXSSRVHV³QHJDWLYH´UHWULEXWLYLVP¶VYLHZRIGHVHUWDVQHFHVVDU\
to justify the severity of a punishment of D. PXQLVKLQJ ' PRUH VHYHUHO\ WKDQ '¶V GHVHUW DOORZV LV PRUDOO\
impermissible.
4. It is assumed throughout that D is a generally competent adult of at least average intelligence.
5. Sometimes, desert is not moral GHVHUW³3HRSOHPDNHGHVHUWFODLPVLQDZLGHYariety of strikingly different
contexts. We might talk, for example, about one person who deserves a promotion, someone else who
deserves a good grade, and some third person who deserves to win the race they are competing
LQ´SHELLY KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 4 (2012). $OVR³QHJDWLYHPRUDOGHVHUW´LVGHVHUWWKDWFDOOVIRU
a bad desert object, such as punishment, instead of a good one, such as praise.
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something morally wrong, D deserves punishment for doing so, and the morally worse the
wrongdoing, the more severe the punishment D deserves for doing it. Retributivism places
MXVWLILFDWRU\ ZHLJKW RQ '¶V GHVHUW ZKHQ DGGUHVVLQJ KRZ VHYHUHO\ WR SXQLVK ' IRU
something that D has done.
A retributive reason is a fact about what punishment, if any, D deserves for doing
something.6 For example, if D is charged with an offense, C, that D did not commit, then
D deserves no punishment for C. That D is innocent of C (and thus deserves no punishment
for committing C) is a retributive reason not to punish D for committing C. On any form
of retributivism, retributive reasons are (at least) relevant to whether punishing D is
justified.7 And, retributive reasons have a characteristic form: ³[D] deserves X in virtue of
F, ³where [D] is a person, X is a mode of treatment, and F [is] some fact about [D].´8 If X
is legally-imposed hard treatment, death, censure, or the like, then F must be a fact about
something D voluntarily did.9
Placing justificatory weight on retributive reasons is consistent with different forms
of retributivism, some of which are very modest. According to some, ³just punishment [is]
one good among many, and one that can be outweighed by other goods that punishing the
deserving puts at risk.´10 RetributivisWV FRXOG HYHQ WKLQN WKDW FULPLQDO ODZ¶V principal
overall objective is preventing social harm, instead of assuring that people get (or get no
more than) their just deserts.11 Regardless of how modest the form of retributivism, the
desert subject must be a moral agent, D, who performs an action that is the desert basis.
Only a moral agent could deserve or not deserve punishment. And the action that is the
desert basis can be referred to as a ³wrongdoing.´12 Finally, if there are no retributive facts,
then no form of retributivism, however modest, is true.

6. 7KLVGHILQLWLRQRI³UHWULEXWLYHUHDVRQ´LVVWLSXODWLYH6R,DPQRWassuming that there are any retributive
reasons. The definition clarifies what such a thing would be if there were any. Sometimes, I will interchangeably
XVHWKHWHUP³UHWULEXWLYHIDFW´
7. $UJXDEO\³>D@OHJDOSKLORVRSKHUGRHVQRW>HYHQ@TXDOLI\DVDUHWULEXWLYLVWLIKH . . awards [retributivism]
only a peripheral role in his rationale for . . SXQLWLYHVDQFWLRQV´'RXJODV+XVDN, Broad Culpability and the
Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 450 (2012).
8. JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 55, 61 (1970).
9. This article does not adopt any position about what, specifically, D should get when D gets what D
deserves. This article brackets omissions liability and focuses on criminal liability for voluntary action.
10. L. ALEXANDER & K. FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 8±  $ORQJVLPLODUOLQHV³>Q@HDUO\HYHU\
retributivist finds room for consequentialist considerations . . . somewhere in his account. . . . [T]o count as
retributive . . . [a theory] need only regard desert and blame as central to attempts to provide answers to normative
questions about . . SXQLVKPHQW´+XVDNsupra note 7, at 450 n.4.
11. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10DW DUJXLQJWKDW³WKHFULPLQDOODZ¶VSULPDU\FRQFHUQLVWKH
SUHYHQWLRQRIKDUP´ZKLOHHQGRUVLQJDPRGHUDWHIRUPRIUHWULEXWLYLVP ³>,@WLVSHUIHFWO\FRQVLVWHQWWRDVVHUWboth
that the General Justifying Aim of . . . punishment is its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of the
General Aim should be qualified or restricted out of deference to [retributive] principles of Distribution.´HART,
supra note 3 at 5.
12. %\³ZURQJGRLQJ´,PHDQDQDFWLRQWKDWLVmorally or ethically bad or wrong, remaining neutral about
what the moral badness/wrongness of a morally bad/wrong action amounts to. This paper considers punishment
for malum in se offences only. In different contexts, one could refer to the commission of a malum prohibitum
RIIHQFHDVD³ZURQJGRLQJ´RUGLVWLQJXLVK³FULPLQDOO\LOOHJDO´ZURQJVWKDWDUHDOVRPRUDOZURQJVIURPWKRVHWKDW
are wrongs only because criminally illegal. I am ignoring such complications.
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III. RETRIBUTIVISM, CONTROL, AND A PUZZLE ABOUT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
For a retributive fact about D to exist, D must deserve punishment for some
wrongdoing that D performs. Such desert requires D to be morally responsible for that
wrongdoing. ,ZLOOGHVFULEH'¶VZURQJGRLQJVDVEODPHZRUWK\DQG'WKHDJHQWDVPRUDOO\
responsible for performing it. '¶V ZURQJGRLQJ LV EODPHZRUWK\ RQO\ LI ' LV PRUDOO\
responsible for performing it.13 Further:
When we hold [D] [morally] responsible for acting wrongly, [D] is not the same as
WKHIHDWXUHRI>'¶V@DFWIRUZKLFKZHKROG>'@UHVSRQVLEOH. Because our blame and
punishment are directed at the agent [D] but are justified (if they are) by the wrongmaking features of what [D] has done, their grounding must include some
DSSURSULDWHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHDJHQW>'@DQG>'¶V@DFW¶VZURQJ-making features.14
Arguably, for D to be related in the right way to the wrong-PDNLQJIHDWXUHVRI'¶V
blameworthy actions two conditions must be satisfied: (1) D must have sufficient control
over what D does, and (2) D must have sufficient knowledge about what D does, including
the context in which D acts. We can refer to (1) as a voluntariness condition and (2) as an
epistemic condition.15 I will assume that, for a retributive justificatory ³grounding´ RI'¶V
SXQLVKPHQWWREHDGHTXDWHWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ'DQG'¶VDFW¶VZURQJ-making features
must accommodate both the voluntariness condition and the epistemic condition. The
focus going forward, however, will be the voluntariness condition. 16
Retributive facts about D exist only if D performs blameworthy actions. Restricting
RXUDWWHQWLRQWR'¶VZURQJGRLQJVWKDWDUHFULPLQDORIIHQFHVDVDILUVWDSSUR[LPDWLRQ'¶V
action is blameworthy if D ³commit[s] the actus reus of [the] offense with [any] morally
blameworthy state of mind.´17 However, ³[m]any aspects of blame are not matters of mens
rea. . . . [Some] . . . involve actus reus.´18 7KH EODPHZRUWKLQHVV RI '¶V ZURQJGRLQJ
depends on factors other than the sorts of mental states that D had, or should have had,
when D acted. The ³conduct´ element of any actus reus features a voluntary act. This
³voluntary act UHTXLUHPHQW´(VAR) requires that D have the right sort of control over what
D does when D does it.19 And, insofar as the VAR is to be justified along retributivist lines,

13. Moral responsibility is a necessary condition for praiseworthy actions as well. D can be morally
UHVSRQVLEOHIRUGRLQJVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVQRWEODPHZRUWK\%XWLI'¶VDFWLRQLVEODPHZRUWK\WKHQ'LVPRUDOO\
responsible for doing it.
14. GEORGE SHER, WHO KNEW? 147 (2009).
15. See id. (employing this terminology). This dual requirement for moral responsibility has been expressed
LQGLIIHUHQWZD\V³$FWVWKDWDUHYROXQWDU\UHFHLYHSUDLVHDQGEODPHZKHUHDVWKRVHWKDWDUHLQYROXQWDU\UHFHLYH
pardon and sometimes pity too. . . . Actions are regarded as involuntary when they are performed under
FRPSXOVLRQRUWKURXJKLJQRUDQFH´Id. at 3 (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS  -$.7KRPSVRQWUDQV ³>$@Q\EHLQJZKRLVKHOGUHVSRQVLEOHPXVWEHVXIILFLHQWO\UDWLRQDO
DQGDXWRQRPRXVWREHDPRUDODJHQW´IRU³RQO\VXFKEHLQJVDUHFDSDEOHRIEHLQJPRUDOO\FXOSDEOH´MICHAEL
S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 403 (1997).
16. In the remainder of this article, for any action discussed for which an agent might be morally responsible,
I will assume that the epistemic condition is satisfied. Going forward, moral responsibility turns on whether the
voluntariness condition is satisfied.
17. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 118 (6th ed. 2012) (emphasis added).
18. Husak, supra note 7, at 458.
19. 7KH$PHULFDQ0RGHO3HQDO&RGHIRUPXODWHVWKH9$5DW  ³$SHUVRQLVQRWJXLOW\RIDQRIIHQVH
unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which
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for D to deserve punishment for doing something, D must exercise the right kind of control
when D does it.
In sum: (a) retributivism requires the existence of retributive facts about D; (b) the
H[LVWHQFHRIUHWULEXWLYHIDFWVDERXW'UHTXLUHV'¶VSXQLWLYHGHVHUW F '¶VSXQLWLYHGHVHUW
UHTXLUHV '¶V EODPHZRUWK\ FRQGXFW DQG G  '¶V EODPHZRUWK\ FRQGXFW UHTXLUHV ' WR
exercise the ³right VRUW´of control when D acts. Thus, serious doubts about whether D has
the ³right VRUW´RIFRQWURORYHU'¶VDFWLRQVWKUHDWHQUHWULEXWLYLVP.
The longstanding debates about determinism and free will have raised such doubts,
and so, the next section will engage some of those debates. To set the stage, this section
concludes with a major assumption, some brief definitions, and a puzzle.
First, the assumption: ³>'@¶V >YROXQWDU\@ DFWLRQV DUH WKRVH HYHQWV LQYROYLQJ >'@
caused (in the right way) by´ D20 DQG '¶V LQWHQWLRQDO VWDWHV21 To get an idea of what
causation ³in the right ZD\´ is, consider a ³GHYLDQW´ FDXVDO FKDLQ EHWZHHQ DQ DJHQW¶V
LQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVDQGKLVERG\¶VEHKDYLRXU
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a
rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the
weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his
hold.22

7KHFOLPEHU¶VLQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVGRQRWILWLQWRWKHULJKWVRUWRIFDXVDOH[SODQDWLRQRI
the loosening of his hold to make the hold-ORRVHQLQJ RQH RI WKH FOLPEHU¶V YROXQWDU\
actions. 7KH FDXVDO H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKH FOLPEHU¶V ERG\¶V EHKDYLRXU LV QRW DQ intentional
explanation. ³Intentional explanations explain a bit of behavior . . . by making it
reasonable in the light of certain beliefs, intentions, [and] desires . . . [of] the agent.´23 If,
instead, the climber voluntarily let go to save himself, then the hold-loosening would have
an accurate intentional explanation, based on the ³right VRUW´of causation. In that case, the
FOLPEHU¶V LQWHQWLRQDO VWDWHV ZRXOG FDXVDOO\ DIIHFW WKH FOLPEHU¶V ERG\¶V EHKDYLRXU LQ D
manner that made the hold-loosening reasonable in virtue of the contents of the causally
operative intentional states.24
KHLVSK\VLFDOO\FDSDEOH´MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2018). The American Law Institute
FODULILHVWKDW³WKHWHUPµYROXQWDU\¶DVXVHGLQ>  @ . . focuses upon conduct that is within the control of
WKHDFWRU´Id. cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
20. If there were no defensibOHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ'DQG'¶VLQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVRSHUDWLQJDVFDXVHVthen this
DVVXPSWLRQ ZRXOG SHUWDLQ RQO\ WR FDXVDWLRQ ³LQ WKH ULJKW ZD\´ E\ '¶V LQWHQWLRQDO VWDWHV , ZLOO FRQVLGHU WKH
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ'DQG'¶VLQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVRSHUDWLQJDVFDuses in Part V.
21. Peter A. Graham, The Standard Argument for Blame Incompatibilism, 42 NOÛS 697, 703 (2008).
22. DONALD DAVIDSON, Freedom to Act, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 63, 79 (2d ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1980).
23. DANIEL C. DENNETT, Mechanism and Responsibility, in BRAINSTORMS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON
MIND AND PSYCHOLOGY   'HQQHWW¶VRULJLQDOGHILQLWLRQRIDQLQWHQWLRQDOH[SODQDWLRQGRHVQRW
UHIHUWRDQDJHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVEXWLQVWHDGUHIHUVWRLQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVWKDWDUH³DVFULEHGWR´DQDJHQWVXFK
DV'E\DQDQDO\VW$)RU'HQQHWW$¶VDVFULSWLRQ RILQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVWRD³V\VWHP´VXFKDV'LVSDUWRI$¶V
DGRSWLRQRIDXVHIXOKHXULVWLFVWUDWHJ\WRZDUG',DPDVVXPLQJWKDWZKHQ'¶VLQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVSOD\DFDXVDO
role (in the sense of efficient causation) that makes an intentional explanation RI'¶VEHKDYLRUWUXH'really has
those intentional states, independently RI WKH KHXULVWLF VWUDWHJ\ WKDW $ FKRRVHV IRU $¶V V\VWHPDWLF SUHGLFWLYH
SXUSRVHV,DPDVVXPLQJWKDW$¶VKHXULVWLFVWUDWHJ\LVXVHIXObecause D really has those intentional states.
24. It bears reemphasis that all of this is part of a major assumption about what a voluntary action is.
'HIHQGLQJ WKLV FRQWHVWHG DVVXPSWLRQ H[FHHGV WKLV SDSHU¶V VFRSH 7R FODULI\ RQH SRLQW LW LV not part of the
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Turning to the definitions: Free will is ³the unique ability of persons to exercise
control over their conduct in the manner necessary for moral responsibility.´25
³Determinism is the thesis that the past and the laws of nature together determine, at every
moment, a unique future   ´26 IndeterminLVP ³is the denial of determinism.´27
Compatibilism is the thesis that it is possible both that determinism be true and that D have
free will.28 Incompatibilism is the denial of compatibilism.29
With the assumption and definitions on the table, consider a puzzle about moral
responsibility (PMR): Moral responsibility for blameworthy action seems to be
incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. 30 Moral responsibility for
blameworthy action seems, therefore, to be impossible. But sometimes agents seem to be
morally responsible for performing blameworthy actions. The impossible therefore seems
to exist.31
A solution to PMR would resolve the seeming contradiction. And, for such a solution
to accommodate retributive facts, the solution must accommodate D¶VKDYLQJWKH³right
VRUW´ of control needed to be morally responsible for performing a blameworthy
wrongdoing.
IV.

DETERMINISM, CONTROL, AND ³8LTIMATE´ MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

For PMR to threaten retributivism, there must be prima facie reasons to think that
WKH VRUW RI FRQWURO QHFHVVDU\ IRU '¶V PRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU EODPHZRUWK\ DFWLRQ LV
incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, as per hard incompatibilism. On
one conception of the control that D must have to be morally responsible for committing
assumption that reasons themselves stand in causal relations to states and events. The things that stand in such
relations under the assumption are intentional states, whose contents are reasons.
25. Michael McKenna & D. Justin Coates, Compatibilism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (last modified
Feb. 25, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. I am adopting this definition by stipulation. So,
I am not assuming that D has this ability. The definition, as far as it goes, states an ability that D would have if D
had free will.
26. Peter van Inwagen, How to Think about the Problem of Free Will, 12 J. ETHICS 327, 330 (2008). More
precisely, determinism is true if and only if the set of the actual laws of nature is deterministicZKHUH³>D@VHWRI
laws of nature is deterministic just in case there is one, and only one, distinct possible world for each initial state
of the world compossible with that set of laws. . . . So, if the [set of laws of nature of the] actual world is
GHWHUPLQLVWLFDQG>'@GRHVQRWĳDWWDQ\ZRUOGLQZKLFK>'@GRHV ĳDWWPXVWHLWKHUKDYHGLIIHUHQWODZVRIQDWXUH
RUDGLIIHUHQWLQLWLDOVWDWH RUERWK IURPWKRVHRIWKHDFWXDOZRUOG´*UDKDPsupra note 21, at 701.
27. Inwagen, supra note 26, at 330.
28. The possibility here is metaphysical: Compatibilism is the thesis that there are possible worlds in which
determinism is true and D has free will. Compatibilists could consistently deny both that determinism is true and
that D has free will. Soft determinists are compatibilists who think that determinism is true and D has free will.
29. Since incompatibilists think that there is no possible world in which determinism is true and D has free
ZLOO LQFRPSDWLELOLVWV ZRXOG GHQ\ WKH VRIW GHWHUPLQLVW¶V FODLP WKDW ERWK DUH WUXH LQ WKH DFWXDO ZRUOG $ hard
incompatibilist is DQLQFRPSDWLELOLVWZKRWKLQNVWKDW³WKHUHLVQRIUHHZLOOLIGHWHUPLQLVPLVIDOVH´0F.HQQD 
Coates, supra note 25. In other words, a hard incompatibilist thinks that free will is consistent with neither
determinism nor indeterminism and is, therefore, metaphysically impossible.
30. Note that I am not endorsing every step of PMR as compelling. PMR serves to frame subsequent
discussion.
31. 7KLVIRUPXODWLRQRI305DSHV3HWHUYDQ,QZDJHQ¶VIRUPXODWLRQRIWKH³3UREOHPRI)UHH:LOO´³>I@UHH
will seems to be incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. Free will seems, therefore, to be
LPSRVVLEOH%XWIUHHZLOODOVRVHHPVWRH[LVW7KHLPSRVVLEOHWKHUHIRUHVHHPVWRH[LVW´3HWHUYDQ,QZDJHQFree
Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, 14 PHIL. PERSP. 1, 11 (2000).
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a crime, C, at t, D must, at t, be able not to commit C. The Principle of Alternate
Possibilities captures this conception: ³[A] person is morally responsible for what he has
done only if he could have done otherwise.´32
Harry Frankfurt poses a counterexample to this principle:
Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. %ODFN KDV OHDUQHG RI -RQHV¶VSODQ DQG ZDQWV -RQHV WR
shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned
that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that,
if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the
resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will
shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for
his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe,
or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never
intervened.33

In the counterexample, Jones seems morally responsible for shooting Smith, even
though Jones could not have done otherwise when he pulls the trigger.
As John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza might say, Jones has ³guidance FRQWURO´
but lacks ³regulative FRQWURO´:
[S]uppose that Sally is driving her car. . . . Sally wishes to make a right turn. As a result of
her intention to turn right, she . . . carefully guides the car to the right. Further . . . assume
that Sally was able to form the intention not to turn the car to the right but to turn the car to
the left instead . . . [and] that, had she formed such an intention, she would have turned the
steering wheel to the left and the car would have gone to the left. . . . Sally guides the car to
the right, but she could have guided it to the left. She controls the car, and . . . she has a
FHUWDLQVRUWRIFRQWURORYHUWKHFDU¶VPRYHPHQWV. Insofar as Sally [] guides the car in a certain
ZD\VKH>H[HUFLVHV@³JXLGDQFHFRQWURO´)XUWKHULQVRIDUDV6DOO\DOVRKDVWKe power to guide
the car in a different way . . VKHKDV³UHJXODWLYHFRQWURO´34

5HWXUQLQJ WR )UDQNIXUW¶V FRXQWHUH[DPSOH VLQFH -RQHV ODFNV UHJXODWLYH FRQWURO
possesses guidance control, and seems morally responsible for shooting Smith, the sort of
control necessary for moral responsibility appears to be some form of guidance control.
Whether this appearance is correct turns, in part, on what being ³truly´ morally responsible
for a criminal wrongdoing requires. On one view, the sort of ³true´ moral responsibility
necessary for punitive desert is ultimate responsibility. D is ultimately responsible for a
wrongdoing if D ³[is], or [is] responsible for, the ultimate (determining) FDXVHVRI>'¶V
wrongdoing], having SHUVRQDOO\GHWHUPLQHGWKH GHWHUPLQLQJ FDXVHVRI>'¶V@DFWLRQVµall
the way back.´35
The ³Consequence Argument,´ which shows that, if determinism is true, then D is
not ultimately responsible for any wrongdoings, helps clarify what ³all the way EDFN´

32. Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829, 829 (1969).
33. McKenna & Coates, supra note 25 VXPPDUL]LQJ)UDQNIXUW¶VFRXQWHUH[Dmple from Alternate Possibilities
and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. PHIL. 829 (1969)).
34. JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 30±31 (1998).
35. K.E. BOXER, RETHINKING RESPONSIBILITY 14 (2013). I aP VWLSXODWLYHO\ DGRSWLQJ %R[HU¶V GHILQLWLRQ
Therefore, I am not assuming that D is ultimately responsible for anything.
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amounts to. First, a pithy version of the Consequence Argument:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and
events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born,
and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences
of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. 36
A recent formalisation of the Consequence Argument by Brian Cutter more
SHUVSLFXRXVO\ XQSDFNV WKH DUJXPHQW¶V VWHSV 37 &XWWHU¶V IRUmalisation requires some
apparatus. In addition to the standard inference rules of modal and propositional logic, we
need, first, an operator, ³1´: Np =df p, and every agent S is such that, for anything S can
do, if S were to do it, it would still be the case that p. Second, we need two inference rules
involving N, where ³ ´is the standard modal operator for broadly logical necessity:
Į  p ٟ Np
ȕ 1 p  q), Np ٟ Nq.38
Third, let P0 be a compOete specification of the world at some moment, t0, before the
existence of any human beings. Fourth, let L be the conjunction of all the laws of nature.
And fifth, let P be a true proposition about some arbitrary thing that happens after t0.
(1) ((P0 & L)  P)
(2) (P0  (L  P))
(3) N(P0  (L  P))
(4) NP0
(5) N(L  P)
(6) NL
(7) NP

[premise ± determinism]
[from 1, standard modal and propositional logic]
>IURP Į @
[premise]
>IURP ȕ @
[premise]
>IURP ȕ @

Letting P be the proposition that D commits C at t (obviously, later than t0), the
Consequence Argument shows that, for anything D can do, if D were to do it, it would still
be the case that D commits C at t. ³All the way back´ in the definition of ³ultimate
responsibility´ can be understood in reference to t0. The Consequence Argument shows
that D cannot personally determine the (determining) causes of (D¶s) actions because those
determining causes are ³fully operative´ at t0, before D, personally, could cause or
determine anything.
Thus, if determinism is true, then, D is not ultimately responsible for committing C.
So, if moral responsibility for committing C requires ultimate responsibility for
committing C, then GHWHUPLQLVP IRUHFORVHV '¶V PRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU FRPPLWWLQJ &
even if D exercises guidance control in committing C. Hence, if ultimate responsibility is
required for ³true´ moral responsibility, then determinism forecloses the existence of any
retributive facts about D. This raises a crucial question: Does ³true´ moral responsibility
require ultimate moral responsibility?
A compatibilist might argue that ultimate responsibility is not required for moral
responsibility. ,Q)UDQNIXUW¶VFRXQWHUH[DPSOH-RQHVVHHPVWREHPRUDOO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRU

36. PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL v (1983).
37. See Brian Cutter, What is the Consequence Argument an Argument for?, 77 ANALYSIS 278, 280 (2017).
&XWWHU¶VIRUPDOLVDWLRQLVEDVHGRQDIRUPDOLVDWLRQLQVAN INWAGEN, supra note 36.
38. See VAN INWAGEN, supra note 36, at 94.
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shooting Smith when Black does not intervene. -RQHV¶VVKRRWLQJ6PLWKLVWKHRXWSXWRID
moral-responsibility-FRQIHUULQJ SV\FKRORJLFDO PHFKDQLVP WKDW LV -RQHV¶V DORQH²a
mechanism that operates unencumbered by ³outside´ or ³external´ interference. ,I-RQHV¶V
exercise of such a mechanism²the unhampered, properly-functioning exercise of which
FRQVWLWXWHV -RQHV¶V H[HUFLVH RI JXLGDQFH FRQWURO²is sufficient for Jones to be morally
responsible for shooting Smith, then Jones is morally responsible for shooting Smith, even
if determinism is true and Jones lacks ultimate responsibility for shooting Smith. 39 The
compatibilist could then elaborate the sort of guidance control mechanism that Jones
H[HUFLVHVWKDWJLYHVULVHWR-RQHV¶V³true´ moral responsibility for his voluntary actions. 40
Indeed, if the Consequence Argument is sound, then it seems that a compatibilist must
deny that: (i) ³true´ moral responsibility requires ultimate responsibility and (ii) ³true´
moral responsibility requires regulative control, not just guidance control. In this way,
compatibilists avoid the foreclosure of retributivism by determinism and could,
consistently, endorse both determinism and retributivism. 41
Settling whether true moral responsibility requires ultimate responsibility, regulative
control, or both exceeds this article¶V VFRSH.42 This section has argued that, on that
assumption, determinism forecloses retributivism. In the next section (focusing on
indeterminism), I will assume WKDW'¶VXOWLPDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\LVUHTXLUHGIRU'WRGHVHUYH
punishment for committing C to consider the implications of that assumption if
indeterminism is true.
V.
A.

INDETERMINISM, CONTROL, AND AGENT CAUSATION

Control and the “Disappearing Agent” Objection

2QWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW'¶VPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\UHTXLUHV'¶VXOWLPDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\
the Consequence Argument provides prima facie UHDVRQV WR WKLQN WKDW '¶V PRUDO
responsibility for blameworthy action is incompatible with determinism. But what about
indeterminism? For PMR to threaten retributivism, there must also be prima facie reasons
WR WKLQN WKDW '¶V PRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LV LQFRPSDWLEOH ZLWK LQGHWHUPLQLVP 43 For the
remainder of this section, I will assume, for the sake of argument, that indeterminism is
true.
Why might RQHWKLQNWKDW'¶VKDYLQJXOWLPDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUFRmmitting C at t

39. 3UHVXPDEO\IRUWKHPHFKDQLVP¶VH[HUFLVHWRFRQIHUPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\XSRQ-RQHVWKHPHFKDQLVPalso
must be responsive to practical reasons available to Jones.
40. Fischer and Ravizza develop this tack. See JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY
AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998).
41. As previously explained, a compatibilist could be an indeterminist. But the main point here is that even a
soft determinist could be a retributivist if moral responsibility does not require ultimate responsibility.
42. I am inclined to think that ultimate responsibility is UHTXLUHGIRU'¶Vtrue moral responsibility but that
regulative control is not required. It is because I think that ultimate responsibility is required that I am an
incompatibilist. But, plausibly defending incompatibilism by defending the necessity of ultimate responsibility
exceeds what I can do in this article. This article, therefore, offers no argument against compatibilists who solve
PMR by denying that ultimate responsibility is required for true moral responsibility.
43. Part of my formulation of PMR is that moral responsibility for blameworthy action seems to be
incompatible with indeterminism.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 6

450

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:441

through the exercise of control is incompatible with indeterminism? If, in addition to
indeterminism, the ³Luck Principle´ is true, then '¶VXOWLPDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\DSSHDUVWREH
ruled out. According to the Luck Principle: ³If an action is undetermined at a time t, then
it¶s happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so
it could not be a free and responsible action.´44 '¶VPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGUHWULEXWLYH
desert would be precluded if nothing, including anything about D, determines, or controls,
'¶VZURQJGRLQJV
[W]here [actions] proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the
SHUVRQZKRSHUIRUP¶GWKHPWKH\LQIL[QRWWKHPVHOYHVXSRQKLPDQGFDQQHLWKHUUHGRXQG
to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil. . . . [T]he person is not responsible for [the actions]
. . . [A]s [they] proceeded from nothing in him . . . tis impossible he can, upon [their] account,
become the object of punishment or vengeance.45

To solve PMR, the incompatibilist could deny the Luck Principle and coherently
explain how, when D commits crime C at t, D could46 exercise control in committing C,
such that:
D is ultimately responsible for committing C at t,
'¶VFRPPLWWLQJ&LVXQGHWHUPLQHGDWWDQG
'¶VFRPPLWWLQJ&DWWLVQRWMXVWDPDWWHURIFKDQFHEXWLQVWHDGLVDPDWWHURI'¶V
exercise of the necessary sort of control, ability, or power.
A challenge to the possibility of such an explanation could be derived from Derk
3HUHERRP¶V³Disappearing Agent Objection.´47 Imagine that D is deciding, a little before
and up to time t, whether to commit crime C.D is motivated, a little before and up to t, by
moral reasons, not to commit C, but D is also motivated, a little before and up to t, by
narrowly self-interested reasons, to commit C. '¶V PRWLYDWLRQV DUH LQWHQWLRQDO 'involving states or events that causally affect how D behaves at t. Further, imagine that
44. Robert Kane, Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, 96 J. PHIL.
217, 217 (1999) (emphases removed).
45. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. II, pt. III, § II. Robert Kane elaborates this idea:
³Suppose two agents had exactly the same pasts . . . up to the point where they were faced with a choice between
distorting the truth for selfish gain or telling the truth at great personal cost. One agent lies and the other tells the
truth. . . . [Such] undetermined choices or actions would be µarbitrary,¶ µcapricious,¶ µrandom,¶ µuncontrolled,¶
µirrational,¶ µinexplicable,¶ or µmatters of luck or chance,¶ and hence not free and responsible actions.´ Kane,
supra note 44, at 222± ,Q D VLPLODU VSLULW ³>L@I ZH DFWHG LQ WKH ZD\ XUDQLXP  HPLWV DOSKD SDUWLFOHV
GHWHUPLQLVPZRXOGEHIDOVHEXW XQOHVVZHDUHJUHDWO\PLVWDNHQDERXWXUDQLXP ´ZHZRXOGQRWEHPRUDOO\
responsible for our actions. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 299 (1981).
46. To solve PMR, the incompatibilist must show only that incompatibilism is consistent with ultimate
responsibility. In other words, the incompatibilist must argue only that there are possible worlds in which
indeterminism is true and D is ultimately responsible. Coherently explaining such a possibility establishes
consistency. Solving PMR this way, however, does not establish a libertarian position, according to which there
actually are retributive facts about morally responsible agents. In other words, even if the incompatibilist solution
to PMR works, all forms of retributivism might, in fact, be false.
47. See, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, FREE WILL, AGENCY, AND MEANING IN LIFE 32 (2014). Pereboom himself
thinks that the incompatibilist explanation to be considered shortly, based on agent-causalism, is coherent but is
not likely WR EH WUXH ³3RVLWLQJ  . . agent-causes . . . involves no internal incoherence. There is no internal
incoherence in the idea of an agent having a . . . causal power to cause her actions deliberately in such a way that
her causation of her actions is not itself produced by processes beyond her control. It is unclear, however, whether
we have any reason to believe that such entLWLHVH[LVW´'HUN3HUHERRPDeterminism al Dente, 29 NOÛS 21, 28
(1995).
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these D-involving states or events do not causally necessitate '¶VGHFLVLRQ. As explained
previously, according to determinism, the laws of nature are deterministic. 48 According to
indeterminism, however, some laws of nature are not deterministic. Some are
probabilistic.49
Consistent with the working indeterministic assumption of probabilistic natural
laws, imagine that the D-involving states or events make p the probability that D commits
C at t and (1 ± p) the probability that D does not commit C at t.50 Next, imagine that D
commits C at t. Although the D-involving states or events occurring before t give D¶V
committing C at t a probability of p, nothing makes it the case that D commits C at t, as
opposed to not committing C at t. Within the scope of the probabilities, what happens at t
is random. ,WLVQHLWKHU'QRUDQ\WKLQJDERXW'WKDWEULQJVDERXW'¶VFRmmitting C at t.
The agent, D, has ³disappeared.´ '¶V ³disappearance´ at t threatens to preclude any
LQFRPSDWLELOLVWH[SODQDWLRQRIKRZ'¶VFRPPLWWLQJ&DWWLVQRWMXVWDPDWWHURI chance
ERXQGHGE\SUREDELOLWLHV EXWLQVWHDGLVDPDWWHURI'¶VH[HUFLVH of the necessary sort of
control. How might the incompatibilist meet this challenge?
B.

Agent Causalism

The incompatibilist might embrace agent causalism to meet the challenge. To clarify
DJHQWFDXVDOLVPFRQVLGHU&KULVWRSKHU)UDQNOLQ¶V³It Ain¶t Me Argument´:
(1) An agent s self-determines a decision d only if (i) s adjudicates between his
various motivations for or against d, and (ii) on the basis of this adjudicating
process s determines or causes d.
(2) If the members of some set of states and events play the causal roles of (i) and
(ii), then s plays the causal roles of (i) and (ii) only if s is identical to (some
members of) this set of states and events.
(3) An agent is not identical to any state or event or any set of states and events.
(4) Therefore, if the members of some set of states and events play the causal roles
of (i) and (ii), then s does not self-determine d.
(5) Therefore, if s self-determines d, then s, and not merely states and events,
causes d.51
The incompatibilist could respond to the challenge posed by the Disappearing Agent
Objection by endorsing step three and accepting agent causalism, according to which the
agent, D, is a substance having a set of choice-enabling properties in virtue of which D
has a certain power, which ³is not characterized by any function from circumstances to
effects.´52 The choice-enabling properties ³make possible the direct, purposive bringing

48. See infra n. 26.
49. ³>$@ODZLVSUREDELOLVWLFLILWDIILUPVWKDWRQWKHDYHUDJHDVWDWHGIUDFWLRQRIFDVHVGLVSOD\LQJDJLYHQ
FRQGLWLRQ ZLOO GLVSOD\ D FHUWDLQ RWKHU FRQGLWLRQ DV ZHOO´ Law of nature, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/law-of-nature#ref285134 (last modified Mar. 20, 2014).
50. The intended interpretation of probability here is non-subjective.
51. Christopher Evan Franklin, If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an AgentCausalist, 125 MIND 1101, 1120±21 (2016).
52. 7LPRWK\2¶&RQQRUWhy Agent Causation?, 24 PHIL. TOPICS 143, 145 (1996).
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about of an effect by [D].´53 ³Substance´ here expresses ³the concept of object, or thing
when this is contrasted with properties or events.´54 Substances have properties and are
involved in events. Imagine that D eats a carrot named ³Harvey.´ Harvey is a substance.55
Orangeness and edibility are two properties that Harvey has. '¶VLQJHVWLQJ+DUYH\LVDQ
event that involves two substances²Harvey and D. D is not a property or an event. D has
the property of having a mouth, and so on.
$FFRUGLQJWRDJHQWFDXVDOLVP¶VIRLOHYHQWFDXVDOLVPDOOFDXVHVDQGHIIHFWVDUHVWDWHV
or events, and hence, the only kind of basic causal relation is one whose relata are states
or events.56 In contrast, according to agent causalism, although all effects are states or
events, some causes are substances. There is an irreducible type of causal relation, in which
D, a substance, causes a state or event. According to agent causalism,
causation by [D] is causation by such a substance. Since a substance is not the kind of thing
that can itself be an effect (though various events involving it can be) . . . [D] is in a strict
DQG OLWHUDO VHQVH DQ RULJLQDWRU RI >'¶V@ [blameworthy] decisions, an uncaused cause of
them.57

The idea of this second, irreducible type of causal relation²substance-causation²
is old.58 According to Roderick Chisholm, Aristotle alludes to the two different types of
causal relation when Aristotle states: ³[a] staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand,
which is moved by a man.´59 Agent causalism depicts D as able to act in a kind of
autonomous, self-determining way. Such causal autonomy requires that D have an
³originating´ FDXVDOFRQWURORYHU'¶VDFWLRQV. Having this sort of control, in turn, requires
that D be a substance that can agent-cause certain events. Thus, according to agent
FDXVDOLVPWKHWKLUGVWHSRIWKH,W$LQ¶W0H$UJXPHQW²³>D@n agent is not identical to any
state or event or any set of states and events´²is true.
What would asserting that D is identical to a (set of) state(s) or a (set of) events
amount to? We should keep retributive theories of punishment in mind when answering
this question. When D is morally responsible for committing C, it is D, if anyone, who
53. Id. (emphasis removed).
54. Howard Robinson, Substance, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (last modified Feb. 3, 2014),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/.
55. In asserting that Harvey is a substance, I am bracketing potential metaphysical issues pertaining to
PHUHRORJLFDOQLKLOLVPDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK³WKHUHDUHQRFRPSRVLWHREMHFWV²i.e. objects with proper material
SDUWV´*DEULHOOH&RQWHVVDOne’s a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism without Ordinary-Object Eliminativism, 55
ANALYTIC PHIL. 199, 199 (2014). I am ignoring any possible complications involved, for example, in holding
WKDWWKHUHDUHQRFDUURWVEXWRQO\³DWRPV´DUUDQJHGFDUURW-wise.
56. ³>7@KHHYHQW-causalist [contends] that the causation of events intrinsic to . . . [blameworthy] actions by
[D] . . LVMXVWDPDWWHURIµRUGLQDU\¶HYHQW-FDXVDWLRQ´-RKQ%LVKRSAgent-causation, 92 MIND 61, 63 (1983).
57. Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (rev. ed. 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/ (emphasis
DGGHG 7KHRULJLQDOYHUVLRQRIWKLVVWDWHPHQWUHIHUVWR³IUHH´QRW³EODPHZRUWK\´GHFLVLRQV
58. There might be a single type of irreducible causal relation such that some relata are of a different
metaphysical category (substances) than others (events). Maybe, whether an event or a substance does the causing
ZKHQDVWDWHRUHYHQWLVEURXJKWDERXWWKH³EULQJLQJ-aERXW´LWVHOILVLUUHGXFLEO\WKHVDPH
59. Roderick M. Chisholm, Freedom and Action, in FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM 11±44 (Keith Lehrer, ed.
1966) (quoting ARISTOTLE, Physics, 256a). I remain neutral as to whether Aristotle intended this statement to
illustrate the two types of causation under discussion. The point is simply that the idea of substance causation is
an old one, possibly ancient.
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deserves punishment for committing C. 60 What is the relationship between D and the
wrong-PDNLQJ IHDWXUHV RI '¶V DFWLRQ WKDW JURXQGV D GHVHUW-based justification for
punishing D, not someone else, for performing that action? Asserting that D is identical
to a set of states or events implies a ³Bundle Theory´ of personal agents, such as D.
According to the Bundle Theory, D just is a complex event comprising experiences,
intentional events, and so forth. During any time-VHJPHQWRUPRPHQWRI'¶VH[LVWHQFH'
does not ³entirely exist´²only the part of D that is currently ³happening´ does: ³Where are
long series of different mental states and events. . . . Each series is unified by various kinds
of causal relation. . . . [A] Bundle Theorist denies the existence of persons. . . . If . . .
persons are . . . separately existing things, distinct from . . . various kinds of mental states
and events.´61
6RWKH,W$LQ¶W0H$UJXPHQW¶VSUHPLVHWKDW'LVnot identical to any state or event
or any set of states and events entails that the Bundle Theory is false. And, it seems that
the incompatibilist must deny the Bundle Theory to prevent the Disappearing Agent
Objection from precluding any explanation of how D exercises control in committing C at
WVXFKWKDW , 'LVXOWLPDWHO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUFRPPLWWLQJ&DWW ,, '¶VFRPPLWWLQJ&LV
XQGHWHUPLQHGDWWDQG ,,, '¶VFRPPLWWLQJ&LVQRWMXVWDPDWWHURIFKDQFHEXWLQVWHDGLV
DPDWWHURI'¶VH[HUFLVHRIWKHQHFHVVDU\sort of control, ability, or power.
5HFDOO WKDW WKH 'LVDSSHDULQJ $JHQW 2EMHFWLRQ FRQVLGHUV D VFHQDULR LQ ZKLFK '¶V
motivations are intentional, D-involving states or events that causally affect, without
QHFHVVLWDWLQJ '¶V FRPPLWWLQJ & DW W. On the Bundle 7KHRU\ '¶V PRWLYDWLRQV DUH Dinvolving intentional events in virtue of being proper spatiotemporal parts of D²the big
event that D is includes them. The Bundle Theory elaborates the relationship between D
and the wrong-making features of C that grounds a desert-based justification for punishing
D for C as follows: C has wrong-making features. &LVFDXVHGLQSDUWE\'¶VPRWLYDWLRQV.
'¶VPRWLYDWLRQVDUH'¶VPRWLYDWLRQVLQYLUWXHRIEHLQJVSDWLRWHPSRUDOSDUWVRI'DQGQR
other agent. D is, therefore, uniquely related to the wrong-making features of C because it
is intentional events that D, and no other agent, spatiotemporally comprises that ³partially´
cause, without necessitating, C at t.
Now, rehearse the Disappearing Agent Objection once more: Consistent with the
assumption of indeterminism, imagine that the D-involving events (that D just is, or
comprises) make p the probability that D commits C at t and that they make (1 ± p) the
probability that D does not commit C at t. 62 Next, imagine that D commits C at t. Although
the series of D-LQYROYLQJHYHQWV WKDW'MXVWLVRUFRPSULVHV RFFXUULQJEHIRUHWJLYH'¶V
committing C at t a probability of p, nothing else²indeed, nothing at all²makes it the
case that D commits C at t, as opposed to not committing C at t. Within the scope of the
probabilities, what happens at t is random. It is neither D nor anything about D that brings
DERXW '¶V FRPPLWWLQJ & DW W. The agent, D, has ³disappeared.´ If D just is or
spatiotemporally comprises a set of D-involving intentional events governed by
probabilistic natural laws²and nothing more²then all that D or any spatiotemporal part

60. To simplify, I am ignoring the possibility of desert-based complicity liability here.
61. DEREK PARFIT, Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons, in MINDWAVES: THOUGHTS ON
INTELLIGENCE, IDENTITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS 19±26 (1987).
62. The intended interpretation of probability here is non-subjective.
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of D could do is ³control´ the probabilities. Within the scope of those probabilities, what
happens would be random. The Bundle Theory invites the Luck Principle problems back
into the picture.
/RRNLQJDW'¶VFRQWURODQGWKH%XQGOH7KHRU\RIDJHQWVIURPDQRWKHUDQJOHLI'
just is a very complex event consisting of a set or series of causally necessitated and/or
probabilistically randomized mental events²some of which form whatever chains of
SUDFWLFDO UHDVRQLQJ UHVXOW XOWLPDWHO\ LQ DOO '¶V DOOHJHGO\  YROXQWDU\ FKRLFHV DQG
actions²then it is hard to see how D could satisfy the voluntariness condition for moral
responsibility, given the assumption that moral responsibility requires ultimate
responsibility. D could not ³control´ '¶V FKRLFHV DQG DFWLRQV WR EHFRPH XOWLPDWHO\
responsible for them any more than a hurricane could ³control´ how it behaves to become
ultimately responsible for its behaviour.
Thus, an incompatibilist aiming to solve PMR should accept that D is not identical
to a series of states or events. To be the sort of thing that could exercise the necessary sort
of control, ability, or power at t such that &¶VFRPPLVVLRQDWWGRHVQRWRFFXUrandomly
(within probabilities), D must be a substance that can cause C at t without being determined
to do so. D must be a substance capable of exercising agent-causal control at t. It is by
exercising agent-causal power in bringing about C at t that D becomes morally responsible
for committing C.63
If agent causalism is coherent, and therefore possible, the incompatibilist can solve
PMR by offering a strong prima facie UHDVRQ ZK\ '¶V XOWLPDWH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU
blameworthy action is compatible with indeterminism.64 The incompatibilist can argue
that retributive facts about D are possible, HYHQLI'¶VPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\UHTXLUHV'¶V
ultimate responsibility.65 So, PMR is not an unresolvable puzzle about the existence of
impossible things, even if ultimate responsibility is necessary for moral responsibility.
There are possible worlds in which: (I) D is ultimately responsible for committing C at t,
,, '¶VFRPPLWWLQJ&LVXQGHWHUPLQHGDWWDQG ,,, '¶VFRPPLWWLQJ&LVQRWjust a matter
RIFKDQFHEXWLQVWHDGLVDPDWWHURI'¶VH[HUFLVHRIagent-causal control.
7RURXQGRXWWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHLQFRPSDWLELOLVW¶V³agent-causal´ solution to PMR,
it is worth examining the relationship between agent-causal control and the distinction
between guidance control and regulative control. 5HFRQVLGHU)UDQNIXUW¶VFRXQWHUH[DPSOH
WR WKH 3ULQFLSOH RI $OWHUQDWH 3RVVLELOLWLHV XQGHU WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW -RQHV¶V PRUDO
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU VKRRWLQJ 6PLWK UHTXLUHV -RQHV¶V XOWLPDWH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU doing so.
$JHQW FDXVDOLVP HQDEOHV DQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI )UDQNIXUW¶V FRXQWHUH[DPSOH DFFRUGLQJ WR
which: (A) Jones lacks regulative control over shooting Smith, and (B) Jones is ultimately

63. Some incompatibilists do not find agent causalism appealing. According to Robert Kane, incompatibilists
who believe in free will sometimes:
SRVLW³H[WUDIDFWRUV´LQWKHIRUPRIXQXVXDOVSHFLHVRIDJHQF\RUFDXVDWLRQ VXFKDVQRXPHQDOVHOYHV
immaterial egos, or nonoccurrent agent causes) to account for what would otherwise be arbitrary,
uncontrolled, inexplicable, or mere luck or chance. . . . Such appeals introduce additional problems
of their own without . . . directly confronting the deep problems about indeterminism, chance, and
luck.
Kane, supra note 44, at 223.
64. The possibility here is metaphysical.
65. The possibility here is metaphysical.
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responsible for shooting Smith in virtue of exercising agent-causal guidance control.
The agent causalist could accept (A) because Jones is unable to do otherwise than
shoot Smith, even if indeterminism is true. The explanation of why Jones lacks regulative
FRQWURO GLIIHUV IURP WKH &RQVHTXHQFH $UJXPHQW¶V GHWHUPLQLVWLF H[SODQDWLRQ KRZHYHU.
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH FRQGLWLRQV VSHFLILHG LQ )UDQNIXUW¶V FRXQWHUH[DPSOH WKH IROORZLQJ
counterfactual about Black is true: If Jones showed any signs that he would decide not to
shoot Smith, then Black would intervene to override that decision by making Jones decide
to shoot Smith. On the agent-causal, indeterministic interpretation, this true counterfactual
is about how Black would exercise his agent-causal power to ³override´ -RQHV¶VDJHQWFDXVDOSRZHUVKRXOGGRLQJVRVXLW%ODFN¶VDLPV. Because of Black, Jones cannot access or
actualise any possible world in which he does not shoot Smith. As a matter of contingent
IDFW%ODFNZRXOGSUHYHQW-RQHV¶VDFFHVVif Jones tried to actualise such a possible world.
The agent causalist could also accept (B). On the agent-causal, indeterministic
interpretation, Jones is ultimately responsible for shooting Smith in virtue of exercising a
form of guidance control. But, tKHDJHQWFDXVDOLVWZRXOGGHQ\WKDW-RQHV¶VH[HUFLVHRIVXFK
guidance control can be identical to the operation of a properly-functioning, reasonsresponsive, psychological mechanism. In addition, for exercising guidance control to
confer ultimate responsibility upon Jones, his shooting Smith must ³hav[e] a causal history
LQZKLFK>-RQHV@LVWKHVRXUFHRI>-RQHV¶V@DFWLRQLQDVSHFLILFZD\´²Jones must agentcause the shooting.66 By agent-causing the shooting, Jones originates it. By originating it,
Jones himself is the ultimate determining cause of his shooting Smith. Jones himself is the
VKRRWLQJ¶V GHWHUPLQLQJ FDXVH ³all the way back.´ By exercising agent-causal guidance
control, Jones is ultimately responsible for shooting Smith, even though Jones lacks
regulative control over shooting Smith.
VI. CONCLUSION
Retributive facts must exist for any form of retributivism to be true. In order for there
to be retributive facts about D, D must be morally responsible for committing some crime,
C. ,I'¶VPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\UHTXLUHV'¶VXOWLPDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WKHQ'PXVWH[HUFLVH
control in committing C in virtue of which D is ultimately responsible for committing C.
7KH&RQVHTXHQFH$UJXPHQWVKRZVWKDW'¶VH[HUFLVHRIVXFKFRQWUROLVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK
determinism. And, even if determinism is false, Section V has argued that D must exercise
agent-causal guidance control in committing C for D to be ultimately responsible for
committing C. Therefore²If moral responsibility does not require ultimate responsibility,
then both soft determinism and event-causal indeterminism are consistent with
retributivism. But, on the assumption that ultimate responsibility is required for moral
responsibility: (1) if determinism is true, then no retributive theory of punishment is true.
And, (2) if agent causalism is false, then no retributive theory of punishment is true, even
if determinism is false.

66. See PEREBOOM, supra note 47.
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